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America’s increasing strategic focus on the Asia-Paciﬁc has been one of the distinctive 
features of the foreign and security policy of the Obama administration.1 This renewed 
attention has been determined both by the global power shift towards Asia, caused by 
the rapid economic development of Asian countries, and by the new challenges the 
region poses to American primacy and the present international order.2 
The main element of instability over the longer term is represented by the economic, 
political and military rise of China. Militarily, the challenge posed by the PRC is represented 
by its capacity to erode the United States’ ‘Command of the Commons’ - that is, its ability 
to control and use the commons of air, sea, space and cyber-space militarily, and to 
credibly threaten to deny their use to other states.3
As a consequence of the development of these capabilities, US forces could ﬁnd 
themselves locked out of the area between mainland China and the First Island Chain, 
losing the capacity to project power in this increasingly relevant area. Economically, the 
seas within the First Island Chain are decisive for the control of the maritime lines of 
communication connecting China with the Paciﬁc region, but also with the Middle East 
and Europe. Strategically, the creation of a ‘no go zone’ for American forces would 
decisively damage the capacity of the United States to exercise extended deterrence and 
to protect its Asian allies.
1 Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘America’s Paciﬁc Century’ Foreign Policy. (November 2011). accessed November 19, 2012,  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_paciﬁc_century 
2 On ‘power shifts’ see Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift in Global Power to the East (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2009). Danny Quah, ‘The global economy’s shifting centre of gravity,’ Global Policy 2 (2011): 3-9. For a 
critical view, Michael Cox, ‘Power Shift and the Death of the West? Not Yet!’ European Political Science Review 10  
(2011): 416–424.
3    Barry Posen, ‘Command of the commons. The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,’ International Security 28  
(2003): 5-46. 
2There are three main trends of the Chinese modernisation programme that have 
contributed to a gloomier threat assessment on the part of American planners: the 
growth of China’s ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, the ongoing development of a 
blue-water Navy and the technological development of the People’s Liberation Army Air 
Force (PLA).4 
4 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2002). Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today. Tradition and Transformation in the 21st Century (London: 
Routledge, 2012)  
Source:  Jan Van Tol and Andrew Krepinevich, AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure  
             Operational Concept. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. May 2011.  
             http://luckybogey.ﬁles.wordpress.com/2010/12/r-20100518-2.jpg
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3According to the most recent assessments, the PLA has gained the Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2AD) capabilities necessary to potentially degrade the United States’ ability to operate in 
airﬁelds near Chinese territory; to hinder forward deployments within the area encompassing 
the First Island Chain; and to prevent naval surface assets from operating in waters near 
Chinese shores.5 Moreover, the PLA would be able to disrupt severely the command and 
control, early warning, or supply capabilities of forward-deployed forces to a degree great 
enough to force potential combatants to relocate to more distant locations.
As a consequence of these trends, a recent report of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment (CSBA), an non-partisan think tank with close links to the Pentagon and the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), recently argued that ‘US force 
structure will be compelled to pay an increasingly high – and perhaps prohibitive – price 
should Washington attempt to conduct traditional types of power-projection operations’6.
The magnitude of the challenge posed by China’s new capabilities has led the US to ‘pivot 
towards the Asia Paciﬁc’, a process of diplomatic and military re-engagement and a renewal 
of America’s commitment to the region.7 
The ‘pivot to Asia’ is having a signiﬁcant impact upon Washington’s bilateral relationship with 
key local partners, but primarily with Japan, historically the United States’ main political and 
strategic partner in the area.8
The pivot is multidimensional, encompassing diplomatic, economic and military aspects. 
Washington recently undertook a sustained diplomatic effort that led to a bilateral détente 
with former enemies, such as Myanmar and Vietnam. Moreover, the Obama administration 
promoted a number of initiatives aimed at re-establishing the ‘network centrality’ of the US 
in economic and commercial ﬁelds.9 The main aim of such initiatives is to restore America’s 
role as the main promoter of regional economic integration and to reassert its function as the 
‘indispensable nation’ to that process.
 
 
5 Anti-access capabilities are those associated with denying access to ﬁxed-point targets, especially large forward bases, while area-
denial capabilities are those that threaten mobile targets over an area of operations, principally maritime forces. Jan Van Tol and 
Andrew Krepinevich, AirSea Battle A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.  
May 2011.
6 ibid
7 Daniel Drezner, ‘Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times´. Foreign Affairs. 90  (2011). 
Xenia Dormandy, ‘Prepared for Future Threats? US Defence Partnerships in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region.’ Chatham House Program 
Report. June 2012.
8     Apart from Japan, key allies of the US are Australia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia. Julius Cesar I. Trajano, ‘US Alliances 
with the Philippines and Thailand: Partnerships or Interests?’ RSIS Commentaries 154 (2012). Bruce Vaughn,  Australia: Background 
and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service. January 2012. Thomas Lum, ‘The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests’. 
Congressional Research Service.  April, 2012  
9 On the concept of network centrality in US grand strategy see Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Grand strategy of Network Centrality’ 
in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, America’s Path Grand Strategy for the Next Administration. Center for a New American 
Security 2012. 
4The military dimension of the pivot encompasses two main components: a phase of 
internal balancing aimed at boosting US military capabilities, and a phase of external 
balancing to deepen and strengthen security relations with local allies.
The ‘pivot to Asia’ will lead to a reconﬁguration of US military posture overseas, including 
a reduction in the forces deployed to Europe, and possibly to the Middle East, and 
an increasing American presence in the Asia Paciﬁc theatre. Furthermore, the Obama 
administration is developing a number of tactical and technological countermeasures 
in order to offset China’s A2AD strategy and has been developing a new operational 
concept labelled ‘Air-Sea Battle’, which seeks to re-organise US force posture and 
reafﬁrm American hegemony in the contested commons.
AirSea Battle – a product of the CSBA – is an operational concept focused on the 
development of integrated air and naval capabilities designed to maintain the capacity to 
project military power even if adversaries are able to deploy a sophisticated anti-access 
area denial strategy. Its signiﬁcance lies in its centrality for future US procurement, and 
signiﬁes a return to more symmetric capacities following the drawdown of counter-
insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst ofﬁcially it is not exclusively 
directed against the PLA and its A2AD capabilities, the new concept is clearly aimed 
at strengthening extended deterrence in the Asia Paciﬁc region and limiting China’s 
capacity to blackmail or coerce Asian allies of the United States. Moreover, this new 
concept provides operational guidance in the case that deterrence fails, outlining a 
detailed battle plan to degrade the PLA’s A2AD capabilities and to re-establish America’s 
capacity to project power within the First Island Chain.  
At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the Obama administration is trying to 
turn its main Asian allies, and primarily Japan, into active security providers in the region, 
inducing them to expand their roles and to increase their military capabilities. 
 
THE PIVOT AND THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The American pivot toward the Asia Paciﬁc, as well as the increasing A2AD capabilities 
of the PLA, has accelerated the development of the US-Japan alliance that has been 
evolving since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after 1997. The pivot reinforces 
trends initiated after the end of the Cold War aimed at renewing and deepening the 
alliance and encouraging a more active Japanese security strategy in East Asia. 
During the Cold War, the US-Japan alliance was based on America’s provision 
of deterrence and security, in return for which Japan behaved as ‘America’s 
Unsinkable Aircraft carrier’, supplying bases and remaining committed to the West. 
 
 
 
5This logic of security for ﬁdelity was embodied by Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty 
signed in 1960, which obliged Washington to defend Japan in case of attack, while Tokyo 
had no such obligation in case of a direct attack against the United States. This allowed 
Japan to develop a Paciﬁst security strategy and to keep to a minimum its involvement in 
the proxy wars that destabilised East Asia throughout the Cold War.
Since the end of the Cold War, the shifting security environment has stimulated two 
distinct moments of redeﬁnition and enhancement of the alliance, in 1997 and 2005. 
On both occasions, amendments to the Mutual Security Treaty highlighted a progressive 
increase in the importance of article 6 of the Mutual Security Treaty that emphasises 
collaboration between the US and Japan in the promotion of peace and stability 
in the region. 
The ﬁrst post-Cold War amendment to the regime established by the Mutual Security 
Treaty took place with the ‘Review of the Defense Guidelines on US-Japan relations 
and regional security’ released in November 1997.10 That agreement established an 
improved structure and policy guidelines for US-Japan roles and missions in order to 
reach a higher degree of cooperation and coordination, both in normal circumstances 
and in the case of emergency. Previous agreements foresaw joint military activities and 
common planning only the case of a major international crisis or a direct attack against 
assets on Japanese soil. The new peacetime cooperation therefore represented a major 
change to the mechanics of the alliance. In addition, the revised guidelines provided 
a normative framework for cooperation regarding issues not previously covered by 
existing agreements, such as international humanitarian relief activities, emergency relief 
operations, and cooperation in UN peacekeeping activities. The 1997 revision therefore 
represented an important step in Japan’s quest for a more equal security partnership with 
the US. Nevertheless, Japan did not totally commit itself to its expanded role, which was 
still marked largely by non-combative, rear area functions. Above all, Japan’s desire to 
hedge against entrapment and to avoid excessive entanglements was clear.11 In 1997, 
the Japanese ﬁrmly maintained their position on the principle of the non-exercise of 
collective self-defence and reasserted their commitment to the exclusive use of military 
means for self-defence, setting out fundamental limits to their security policy.12 
 
 
 
10 The 1997 guidelines, together with the 1978 guidelines are to be considered legally binding amendment to the Mutual 
Security Treaty signed in 1960. The ‘transformation initiatives’ are considered equally relevant ‘material amendment’ to the 
security regime build around the MSA. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation New York, New York.’ 9-23-1997 
11 On Japanese hedging strategies, Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, ‘Japan’s Dual Hedge,’ Foreign Affairs 81  
(2002): 110-21. 
12 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman. ‘U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?’Issues 
& Insights CSIS Paciﬁc Forum 5 (2005).
6Another relevant step in the redeﬁnition of the alliance took place in 2005, with the 
approval of ‘US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future’ by the 
Security Consultative Committee, made up of the American and Japanese Ministers of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs.13 The document highlighted the evolution of the duties 
of Japan’s armed forces, from limited self-defence to a progressively more marked 
commitment to ‘Far East contingencies’ issues related to Article 6, and broader US-Japan 
cooperation beyond the geographical boundaries of the Far East. 
This evolution of the US-Japan alliance has accelerated as a consequence of the American 
pivot to Asia. Whilst the Treaty and the Guidelines themselves have not been revised 
since 2005, recent trends have enhanced the regime logic, transforming Japan’s role 
from a mere supplier of bases into an active member of the US-led security architecture 
in the Asia Paciﬁc.
At the heart of the pivot is a process of ‘alliance diversiﬁcation’, that is, enhancing 
pre-existing alliances – such as those with South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines – 
and opening new diplomatic channels with former adversaries, including Vietnam and 
Myanmar. Even if Japan remains the cornerstone of the US engagement in the Asia 
Paciﬁc Region, its capacity to dictate terms to the US is diminished by the renewed 
relevance of other bilateral partnerships connecting Washington and other key actors. 
The effect of the US’s alliance diversiﬁcation is that Japan is no longer able to behave 
as a ‘security consumer’, whose mere alignment with the US guaranteed security and 
stability. Instead, Japan is being increasingly forced to rethink its role and enlarge its 
duties in the provision of security and deterrence in the area.14 
Moreover, since Tokyo can no longer play the role of military and logistic rearguard 
for the US military complex it used to, its value to the US geopolitical exchequer is 
considerably diminished.  The new Chinese A2AD capabilities increasingly render the 
main US bases in Japan and Okinawa vulnerable to a possible ﬁrst strike. Whilst this does 
not imply that American forces are likely to abandon such bases altogether, it does mean 
that they will seek to share their power projection hub role with other facilities located 
outside the First Island Chain. This fundamentally alters the strategic relevance of Japan 
as supplier of bases. Since Japanese territory is no longer able to provide a safe rearguard 
for American troops, the United States is increasingly asking Japan to provide different 
contributions to the alliance and to the stability of the region. As a consequence, the 
Obama administration has recently been increasing the pressure on Japan for a more 
active military role in the alliance and less unequal burden sharing. 
13 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and 
Realignment for the Future October 29, 2005. 
14 Patrick M. Cronin, Paul S. Giarra, Zachary M. Hosford and Daniel Katz, The China Challenge Military, Economic and Energy 
Choices Facing the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Center for a New American Security. April 2012. 
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Asia’s changing security environment, characterised most markedly by China’s growing 
capacity and the United States’ pivot in response, is forcing Japan to rethink its role in the 
region. As such, Japan is being forced to pursue a process of ‘normalisation’ that is gradually 
overcoming the legal and political limits of its Paciﬁst security identity of the post-war era. 
Recently, Japan has accelerated the evolution of its security posture, progressively abandoning 
the identity of a ‘peace loving country’ (heiwa kokka), in favour of turning itself into a ‘normal 
nation’ (futsu no kuni).
During the Cold War, the intellectual and political basis for Japanese foreign and security 
policies was the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ espoused by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. In essence, 
this was an attempt to gain protection under the US military umbrella, thus enabling Japan 
to focus national energy and resources on economic regeneration and wealth creation.15 
Yoshida believed the alliance with the United States was necessary to protect Japan 
from the Soviet threat and to enhance domestic political stability. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the Japanese public considered the military responsible for both the war itself 
and Japan’s defeat, and strongly opposed any active role of Japanese forces beyond strict self-
defence. The Yoshida doctrine therefore represented a compromise between the imperative 
to protect the country from the Soviet threat and the domestic need to minimise the role and 
the size of the armed forces.16  
The Yoshida doctrine was entrenched in Japanese institutions in Article Nine of the 
Constitution, that forbids the use of force and the maintenance of a ‘war potential’ whilst 
allowing for a ‘defensive defence’.17 Under the Yoshida doctrine, Japan self-imposed ﬁscal 
limits on defence spending and submitted the military to strict governmental control.18 
In order to minimise its role in the alliance and to institutionalise its ‘paciﬁst identity’ the 
Japanese government approved seven self-binding prescriptions: no participation in collective 
self-defence arrangements; no power projection capability; no production, transport and 
storage of nuclear arms; no arms exports or sharing of defence-related technology; no more 
than one percent of its GDP for defence expenditure; and no military use of space.19
 
 
15 On the Yoshida Doctrine, Kennth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington: AEI Press, 1996). 
Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2008). Richard Samuels, Securing Japan. Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
16 Thomas U. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,’ International Security, 17 (1993): 119–150.
17 Article Nine statutes that ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order 
to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.’ The de facto power to interpret Article Nine lay in the hands of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The whole debate is focused on the deﬁnition of ‘war potential’ (senryoku). On the Article Nine 
and the debate on possible constitutional revisions: J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels ‘Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional 
Reform in Japan,’ East West Center Policy Studies 19 (2005).
18 Sun-Ki Chai, ‘Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine,’ International Organization 51 (1997). 
19 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
_
8By institutionalising these restrictions Tokyo was precluded from playing an active part in 
the containment of Communism in East Asia, and the Japanese government therefore 
managed to avoid entanglement in Cold War politics and in proxy-conﬂicts involving 
their American ally. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, the Yoshida Doctrine has been subject to a gradual 
erosion of its principle directives, as part of a process of the ‘normalisation’ of Japanese 
foreign policy.20 The clearest indication of the overcoming of the Yoshida doctrine has 
been the progressive dilution of the seven self-binding restrictions. Although Japan 
maintains the main symbols of post-war anti-militarism, including Article Nine and the 
ﬁscal cap on military spending, many of the central tenets of the post-war strategy have 
now vanished. Indeed, over the course of the last decade Japan has dispatched the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) abroad, sending a small contingent to Iraq between 
2004 and 2006 and participating in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2009; 
shared military technology with the United States and, since 2012, with the United 
Kingdom; acquired power projection capabilities, with the procurement of weapon 
system such as the Kongo class destroyer and Hyuga class helicopter destroyer; started 
to use outer space for military purposes;21 and reconsidered the ban on the exercise of 
collective defence. 
The process of normalisation of Japanese security strategy has been accompanied by 
a redeﬁnition of Japan’s military posture, most recently highlighted by the release of 
the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines.22 The document introduces ‘dynamic 
deterrence’ as one of the basic roles of the Japanese forces. This concept is designed 
to close any ‘windows of deterrence’ by increasing JSDF activities in the East China 
Sea, and to arrest Chinese ‘creeping expansion’ to avoid any possible fait accompli. 
According to the documents released by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the Japanese 
Self Defense Forces should exercise dynamic deterrence through continuous steady-
state ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), information gathering, military 
exercises, and demonstration of operational effectiveness and readiness through actual 
military operations, such as international cooperation or disaster relief.23
The 2010 NDPG also introduced a new concept establishing the appropriate size and 
structure of Japan’s military forces. Since the 1976 NDPG, the size and the structure of 
the JSDF had been determined by the ‘basic defence forces concept’ (kibanteki boeiryoku 
koso), which established that Japan had to possess only the military capabilities necessary 
to defend its territory from a foreign invasion. The new NDPG replaced ‘basic defence 
 
 
20  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a Normal Military Power (London: Routledge, 2004).
21  The Ballistic Defense system entails the military use of space, since ballistic missiles can be intercepted during the exo-   
 atmospheric, (i.e. outside the Earth’s atmosphere) phase of their trajectory.
22  The NDPG is the highest level document of Japan’s defence policy. It sets principles, roles and force posture of the Japanese  
 Self Defense Force.
23  Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012. 
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9forces’ with the ‘dynamic defence force’ (doteki boeiryoku) concept, which fundamentally 
changes the role and structure of Japan’s military. Japan’s dynamic defence forces should now 
retain autonomous capabilities able not only to repel an invasion, but also to exercise active 
deterrence and contribute to stability and deterrence in the region.
 
The Armitage-Nye Report, released in August 2012, highlights the fact that the 2010 NDPG 
is consistent with how Air-Sea battle is shaping US posture in the region and conditioning 
military to military relations with Asian allies. The new Japanese concept of dynamic defence, 
like Air-Sea Battle, stresses Japan’s role in maritime security, and gives primary importance to 
anti-submarine warfare capabilities, as well as emphasising the increasing strategic relevance 
of the joint US-Japanese Ballistic defence system.24 
Moreover, the NDPG, consistent with the United States’ request for increased interoperability 
and ‘jointness’ between the allied armed forces, mandates the enhancement of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in order to increase operational readiness as main 
priorities for the JSDF and for the alliance. Under the new dynamic defence concept, Japanese 
forces will emphasise regional deterrence at sea, and ensure the security of the maritime areas 
surrounding the archipelago. Moreover, Japanese maritime forces will maintain the ability to 
patrol and, if necessary, gain control of the waters of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. 
The new NDPG also foresees an extra-regional role for Japanese forces, that would be 
deployed as an instrument of a ‘multilayered security network’ encompassing states beyond 
the US – including Korea and Australia – in order to foster maritime security in the Indian 
Ocean and in the Western Paciﬁc.25 The NDPG therefore represents an important step 
in the dismantling of Japan’s post-war self-binding consensus. Moreover, the document 
presents the joint American-Japanese Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system as fundamental 
to the exercise of dynamic deterrence. Japan’s increased involvement in BMD has major 
consequences for the process of normalisation.26 Participation in the system triggered 
the acquisition of potentially offensive military assets such as Aegis destroyers and SM-3 
medium range and PAC-3 missiles, increased command and control capability, and induced 
a signiﬁcant restructuring of the defence establishment, instigating substantial doctrinal 
changes that could allow pre-emption should an attack be deemed imminent. Under the 
broad rubric of missile defence, Japan had to re-evaluate its position on the military use of 
space and on the export of military technology.27 In order to enable Tokyo to enter into BMD 
cooperation with the United States in August 2003, a new ‘Basic Space Law’ entered into force. 
24 Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, The U.S.-Japan Alliance. Anchoring Stability in Asia. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. August 2012. 
25 Alessio Patalano, ‘Japan’s Maritime Strategy. The Island Nation Model,’ The RUSI Journal 156 (2011): 82–89.
26 Matteo Dian, ‘The Chrysanthemum and the Shield. The Paciﬁc Theater Missile  Defense  and  its consequences for Japanese Security 
Strategy,’ WARning Rivista Semestrale di Studi Internazionali. 2 (2012).
27 Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan. From the Market to Military in Japanese Defense Policy 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). Andrew Oros, ‘Explaining Japan’s Tortured Course to Surveillance Satellites,’ Review of 
Policy Research 24 (2007) . 
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The law lifted the ban on the use of space for defensive purposes, changing that 
interpretation to ‘nonaggressive’, meaning the JSDF now can manufacture, possess, and 
operate its own satellites to support military operations such as ballistic missile defence. 
Indeed, since participation in the BMD system authorises the JSDF to intercept a missile 
directed towards the US, Japan’s BMD cooperation implies a de facto  legalisation of collective 
self-defence, and marks a fundamental departure from the Yoshida Doctrine, which was 
centred exclusively on self-defence and did not consider pre-emption a legitimate option. 
As far as other dimensions of the cooperation under the new operational concept 
are concerned, Japan has started a process of modernising its Air Force, acquiring 
interoperable ﬁfth generation aircraft such as the Lockheed Martin F-35, and has 
expanded its submarine ﬂeet, deploying the new Soryu class of diesel propelled 
submarines, and preparing to build the ‘Ryukyu barrier’, designed for anti-submarine 
warfare against the Chinese Navy.28
THE DECLINE OF KOKUSANKA
Paradoxically, the enlargement of Japanese military duties has been coupled with a 
decline in its military budget. During the last two decades, Tokyo has faced a number 
of structural, economic and political problems that indirectly inﬂuenced Japan’s level of 
military capabilities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan’s economy has suffered a 
prolonged period of slow growth. At the same time, the Japanese government never 
abolished the one percent of GDP ceiling on defence spending, which is still considered 
a fundamental binding prescription. Therefore, despite the renewed priority of defence, 
military expenditures have declined continuously for a decade. From 2002 to 2012, the 
military budget shrank by 5.3 percent, while the level of expenditures of other powers 
in East Asia grew massively, including South Korea by 80 percent and China by 208 
percent. What has been described as the ‘Heisei remilitarisation’29 is largely a number 
of life extension measures, budget rationalisations and shifts from procurement of new 
weaponry to equipment maintenance. 
The declining budget, coupled with the enlargement of the JSDF role, accelerated the 
demise of the policy of kokusanka (internalisation and indigenous production), and 
so the practice of pursuing technological self-reliance in the formation of a defence 
base that has been considered one of the fundamental pillars of post-War Japanese 
 
 
 
28 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan Ofﬁcially Selects F-35’ The Diplomat. December 2011. Accessed November 19, 2012  
http://thediplomat.com/ﬂashpoints-blog/2011/12/20/japan-ofﬁcally-selects-f-35/ 
29 The Heisei is the current reign period for Japan. It started in 1989 with the death of the ‘Showa Emperor’ Hiroito and the 
ascension to the throne of his son Akihito. Richard Tanter, ‘With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush 
Doctrine’,  in Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Paciﬁc, ed. Melvin Gurtov et al. (New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2005), 153-180.
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security strategy. At the heart of the Yoshida doctrine was a ‘techno-nationalist’ strategy 
of the internalisation of military technology and catch-up industrialism. This strategy, 
realist at its core, was based on a particular deﬁnition of Japanese comprehensive security. 
During the entire post-war era, Tokyo’s security strategy reﬂected a complex calculus, 
under which the maximisation of military security was frequently subordinated to the pursuit of 
‘techno-economic’ security interests.30 The post-war conservative elite had understood, as 
the ﬁrst generation of Meiji leaders before them, that long-term technological advancement 
was at least as relevant for security as short-term military autonomy, and opted for a limited 
degree of military autonomy in order to activate a virtuous circle of technological innovation 
and indigenisation.31 
Thus during the Cold War, while the US was increasingly pushing for the realisation of 
autonomous defence, Japan opted for a long-term strategy of technological indigenisation 
focused on economic advancement and autonomy, but not necessarily on military self-
sufﬁciency in the short-term. From this point of view, Japan did not need to establish large 
defence capabilities, but instead needed to introduce foreign technology from the United 
States to start a process of indigenisation, nurturing and diffusion of foreign military 
technology to both the military and the civil sectors. 
Recent ﬁnancial pressures on the defence budget substantially impede the continuation 
of these three steps of indigenisation, nurturing and diffusion of defence technology that 
had characterised Japanese defence production during the post-war period. The research 
and development of technological self-reliance, coupled with the Three Principles of Arms 
Exports, presented obstacles for the maintenance of Japan’s defence base since they isolated 
the Japanese defence market from an increasingly globalised defence industry.32 Deliberate 
kokusanka policy resulted in extremely high costs and low production rates. 
The arms export ban had long prevented Japan from exporting weapons, as well as taking part 
in international collaborative activities regarding defence technology developments, thereby 
making the Japanese defence industry dependent solely on domestic procurements, and 
causing it to lag behind the global technological competition. These limits notwithstanding, 
the Japanese government maintained an elevated degree of self-reliance in defence as a 
fundamental priority throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Japanese policymakers made 
 
 
30 Richard J. Samuels, Eric Heginbotham, ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,’ International Security 22 (1998): 171-203.
31 On this point Richard J. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation. Strong Army.’ National Security and Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994). Michael J. Green, Arming Japan : Defense Production, Alliance Politics, And The Postwar Search For 
Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
32 The Three Principles of Arm Export approved by the Japanese Government in 1967 prohibited Japan from exporting weapons to 
Communist-bloc countries, those countries subject to embargoes on arms exports under the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions, 
and those countries engaged or ‘likely to be engaged in international conﬂicts’. This ban seriously handicapped Japan’s defense 
production. The absence of an external market, indeed, reduced the possibility of developing a state of the art weapons 
production capacity. The arms export ban had long prevented Japan from exporting weapons as well as taking part in international 
collaborative efforts regarding defense technology developments, thereby causing the Japanese defense industry to be solely 
dependent upon JDA orders and to lag behind in the global technological competition.
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efforts to maintain the domestic industrial base, ranging from materials to end product 
industries, in the name of economic and national security, even when it had generated 
higher costs and inefﬁciency. Thus Japan has sought to maintain an indigenous 
production base by initiating new projects, such as the P-1 maritime patrol aircraft, 
equivalent to the American Boeing P-8 Poseidon, and the military transport aircraft 
XC-2, equivalent to the C-130 Hercules. These programmes were designed to nurture 
indigenous technologies and preserve the potential for systems integration and building 
larger platforms. The launch of these new programmes notwithstanding, it appears clear 
that Japan is not able to pursue the policy of kokusanka and contemporarily maintain its 
prohibition on arms exports. The export ban was considered one of the cornerstones of 
Japanese paciﬁsm, since it safeguarded against the development of ‘vested interests’ in 
the spreading of conﬂicts around the world, and limited the role of the domestic military 
industrial complex.
Tight budgetary conditions, the expansion of the role of the Japanese armed forces, 
and the high costs associated with the development of state of the art autonomous 
projects made it difﬁcult for Japan to maintain the process of internalisation, nurturing 
and diffusion. At the same time, Japanese defence industries are not able to produce 
state of the art weapons when restricted to relying solely on the internal market. 
The Japanese government progressively recognised the impossibility of maintaining a 
high level of military autonomy. Their solution was to try to preserve Japan’s capacity 
to produce state of the art systems in particular strategic sectors in order to be able to 
participate in a restricted number of international projects, such as the SM-3 Block, UAVs, 
and sonar. The crisis of the Japanese techno-national project is causing the ‘slow death’ 
of Tokyo’s defence base, further undermining Japan’s technological and comprehensive 
national strength, and, therefore, its autonomy in security policy.33 
Broadening Japanese security options and the enlargement of its role in the alliance 
with the United States shifted concern for self-reliance in military production away from 
centre stage, but also reinforced the importance of maintaining an independent defence 
technology base that Japan considers fundamental to its long-term security interests. 
The overlapping effect of the expansion of the JSDF role and the recognition by the 
Japanese government of the necessity of opening the Japanese defence base to co-
production and co-development efforts implied a further integration of Japan into the 
US military complex, with a relevant effect on the alliance. These developments are likely 
to foster military integration in the alliance and redesign the division in military roles 
between American forces in the area and the JSDF. 
 
 
 
33 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘The Slow Death of Japanese Techno Nationalism? Emerging Comparative Lessons for China’s 
Defense Production,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 34 (2011): 451-479.
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For Japan, the increasing acknowledgement that the maintenance of its technological 
and industrial base substantially depends on joint production with the US undermines its 
bargaining power within the alliance. Self-reliance was intended to create bargaining power 
in the alliance, provide diplomatic autonomy, and generate latent autonomous military 
capabilities, whilst avoiding technological dependence. The failure of kokusanka means that 
Tokyo has been compelled by its increasing dependence to cooperate with American wishes 
and integrate itself in the US-led security complex. 
The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) reﬂects the perceived demise of the 
policy of technological self-sufﬁciency in the defence base, anticipating the relaxation of the 
ban against arms exports, later approved by the government in December 2010.34
 
This facilitates Japan’s integration into the Western and global defence market. Recently, 
indeed, the Noda government agreed to the export of the SM-3 Block IIA sea-based missile 
interceptor to NATO members, as well as to participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
project, and to broad technological cooperation with Great Britain. 
These recent developments testify to how Japan is no longer able to insulate itself from 
the global defence industry and to pursue kokusanka while preserving post-war self-binding 
prescriptions such as the Three Principles of Arms Exports. More broadly, the new security 
imperatives determined both by the US pivot and China’s military expansion are making the 
demise of the basic pillars of the Yoshida Doctrine as a comprehensive grand strategy more 
evident.
Overall, the lifting of the Three Principles and the opening of the sector to international 
cooperation has helped slow the decline of Japan’s industrial defence base. However, the 
need to rely on cooperation with the United States and, increasingly, other partners such as 
Britain, inhibits  Japan from achieving the strategic objectives of kokusanka, namely creating 
room of manoeuvre and bargaining power within the US-Japan alliance.
These trends presage a further weakening of Japanese bargaining power, highlighting the 
increasing incapacity of the Japanese government to resist US pressures for a more active role 
in the alliance and less unequal burden sharing. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 The original ban forbade Japan to export weapons and military technology to Communist countries, countries under UN embargo 
and countries involved in international conﬂicts. In 1976 the ban was reinforced completely stopping exports of arms and 
technology sharing with other nations. After the relaxation only export of arms functional to peace building and humanitarian 
assistance. Moreover the share of military technology has been allowed.
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CONCLUSION
The pivot to Asia constitutes the main pillar of the grand strategy of the Obama 
administration. It reﬂects the recognition of the growing geopolitical centrality of the 
Asia Paciﬁc and testiﬁes how the Chinese economic and political challenge became the 
central priority in US foreign policy. 
US military planners currently believe that the effort to maintain American primacy 
should be sustained both by a continuing military presence in the region and by 
increased burden sharing with the local partners. They therefore consider the progressive 
normalisation of Japan fundamental to the current strategic equilibrium. The United 
States wants to encourage the rise of friendly Asian powers, able to act as democratic 
security providers.35 In other words, American strategy in Asia seeks to turn the ‘reluctant 
allies’ of the Cold War into active contributors in the present order and enforcers of 
American command of the commons. 
The military rise of China, coupled with the relative decline of the Japanese defence 
base, necessitated Tokyo’s increased dependence upon Washington. Japan’s progressive 
integration in into the US military complex entails signiﬁcant American control of Japanese 
choices and restrictions on Tokyo’s capacity to preserve a degree of independence and avoid 
entanglements. Moreover, Japan’s bargaining power in the alliance has been undermined 
by the demise of the Yoshida Doctrine, which set out a coherent vision of the 
country’s role in the post-war world, across economic, political and military domains. 
The progressive inadequateness of Yoshida Shigeru’s vision in the post-Cold War period, 
and the need to rethink both Japan’s path to development together with its role in East 
Asia and the alliance, reinforced the United States’ effort to force Tokyo to assume a 
more cooperative stance and became an engaged ally. 
The expansion of the Japanese role in the alliance, as well as the new roles of the JSDF in 
the Asia Paciﬁc, are not symptoms of Tokyo’s autonomy, of a new and more independent 
stance vis à vis Washington, or even an act of balancing against the rise of China or the 
threat posed by North Korea. They are instead a manifestation of the failure of Japan’s 
strategy that sought to resist US pressures for an expanded Japanese security posture 
through the maintenance of constitutional limits and the preservation of autonomy in 
the military, technological and political realms.  
35  Quoted in Daniel Twining, ‘America’s Grand Design in Asia,’ The Washington Quarterly 30 (2007): 79–94. 
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Glossary
A2AD   Anti-Access/Area Denial 
BMD   Ballistic Missile Defence 
CSBA   Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment 
DARPA   Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
NDPG   National Defense Program Guidelines
JSDF   Japanese Self Defense Force
PRC   People’s Republic of China
PLA   People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF   People’s Liberation Army Air Force
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
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MATTEO DIAN
JAPAN AND THE US PIVOT 
TO THE ASIA PACIFIC 
This paper analyses the consequences of the US pivot 
to Asia on the US-Japan alliance and on Japanese 
foreign and security policies. 
On the one hand, the US pivot is reassuring for Tokyo, 
since it seeks to ‘rebalance’ Chinese military ascendency 
and to strengthen extended deterrence in the region.  
On the other hand, it contributes to the acceleration 
of the ‘normalisation’ of Japanese security policies, 
speeding the process of overcoming the institutional 
self-binding prescriptions that underpinned Japan’s  
post-war paciﬁsm. 
This process, inaugurated by the ﬁrst post-Cold 
War renewal of the US-Japan Alliance in 1997 and 
culminating with the adoption of the ‘dynamic defence 
concept’ in 2010 and the relaxation of the Three 
Principles of Arms Control in 2012, created a vicious 
cycle for Japan. During the post-war era, paciﬁst self-
binding prescriptions functioned as ‘anti-entrapment 
devices’ preventing Tokyo from becoming involved in  
the conﬂicts that marked the Cold War in Asia. 
Today an increasingly ‘normal’ Japan is no longer able  
to resist US pressure for a more active role in the alliance 
and less unequal burden sharing. Moreover, China’s 
military rise renders Tokyo ever more dependent on US 
forces. These trends compel Japan to accept further 
integration into the US military apparatus in the region 
and to take additional steps towards the deﬁnitive 
abandonment of Japan’s paciﬁst identity.
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